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THE RISE OF SPEED DEPORTATION
AND THE ROLE OF DISCRETION
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA*
In 2013, the majority of people deported never saw a courtroom or immigration judge. Instead, they were
quickly removed by the Department of Homeland Security via one of several procedures collectively referred
to as “speed deportation.” The policy goals of speed deportation are economic; these processes save
government resources from being spent on procedural safeguards such as a trial attorney, immigration judge,
and a fundamentally fair hearing. Higher deportation numbers may also benefit the image the government
seeks to portray to policymakers who support amplified immigration enforcement. However, the human
consequences of speed deportation are significant and can result in the ejection of people who would otherwise
qualify for relief before an immigration judge or otherwise present strong equities like family ties, long-term
residence, and steady employment in the United States. Moreover, the risk that the government may
wrongly classify a person as a candidate for speed deportation is more than a remote possibility. This
Article examines deportations resulting from the expedited removal, administrative removal, and
reinstatement of removal orders programs and the extent to which the government has discretion to give
individuals who present compelling equities, including eligibility for relief, a more complete court proceeding
before an immigration judge. This Article ends with recommendations the Department of Homeland
Security can take to provide a "day in court" for such individuals.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2013, the majority of people deported never saw a courtroom or immigration judge. Instead,
the Department of Homeland Security quickly removed them via programs termed “expedited removals”,1
“administrative removals”,2 and “reinstatement of removal orders.”3 These programs were created by
Congress and permit the agency to remove or deport a person from the United States without undertaking
the formalized and exhaustive removal hearing.4 While expedited removals, administrative removals and
reinstatements each apply to different sets of individuals, their common feature is a limited set of
procedural protections leading to speedy removals.5 By providing comparatively fewer procedural
safeguards—such as a trial attorney or an immigration judge—speed deportations promote efficient use
of scarce government resources. Higher deportation numbers may also benefit the image the government
Immigration and Nationality Act (hereinafter, “INA”) § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 235.
INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1.
3 INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2014); See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8.
4 INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2014) (spelling out the statutory framework for a removal hearing and various
“rights” and requirements that attach to such a hearing). Throughout this Article, I will use “removal proceeding”,
“removal hearing”, and “court hearing” interchangeably.
5 Throughout this Article, the phrases “speed removal” and “speed deportation” will be used interchangeably
to identify one or more of the following programs: administrative removal, reinstatement of removal, and expedited
removal. Stipulated removal orders, another program aimed at accelerating the removal process, are not reflected in this
Article. Stipulated removal orders are authorized in the INA’s command that “[t]he Attorney General shall provide by
regulation for the entry by an immigration judge of an order of removal stipulated to by the alien (or the alien’s
representative) and the Service. A stipulated order shall constitute a conclusive determination of the alien’s removability
from the United States.” INA § 240(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d) (2014). One reason I do not include stipulated removal
orders is that unlike the speed removal programs identified above, immigration judges participate in the stipulated
removal program and are required to memorialize the removal order. For a thoughtful analysis focused on the stipulated
removal order program, see Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in
Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C.L. REV. 475 (2013).
1
2
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seeks to portray to policymakers who support stricter immigration enforcement. However, the human
consequences of speed deportation are significant and can result in the ejection of people who would
otherwise qualify for relief before an immigration judge or who present strong equities like family ties,
long-term residence, or steady employment in the United States. Moreover, the risk that the government
may wrongly classify a person as a candidate for speed deportation is more than a remote possibility. This
Article examines deportations resulting from the expedited removal, administrative removal, and
reinstatement of removal orders programs. It also examines the extent to which the government has
discretion to give individuals who present compelling equities, including eligibility for relief, a more
complete court proceeding before an immigration judge.
In the last several years, the vast majority of removals have been in the form of speed deportation,
but little scholarship has explored the legitimacy of these programs.6 The data on removals from recent
years suggests that a fraction of people are placed in removal proceedings and heard by an immigration
judge before a removal order is entered. Of the approximately 438,000 non-citizens deported in 2013,
193,032 were removed through expedited removal and 170,247 were subject to a reinstated final order.7
Thus, 82.8% of all removals in 2013 were comprised of expedited removals and reinstatements. By
contrast, at most 75,142 or 17% of those deported were removed following a removal order issued by an
immigration judge within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).8 Data from 2013
reveals a similar proportion9: 438,421 noncitizens were removed from the United States, of which 193,032
or 44% were removed through expedited removal orders and 170,247 or 38.8% were removed through
reinstatements.10 Likewise, 9,217 of these removals were enacted through administrative removal orders.11
These numbers reveal the extent to which DHS removed individuals without a day in court. The
proportions of speed removals in 2012 and 2013 in contrast to removal orders that followed a court hearing
are striking and illustrate how greatly DHS relies on speed removal programs to carry out its mission to
enforce the immigration laws.12
Cumulatively, the numbers reveal that for the last several years, more than half of the total
population removed from the United States has bypassed a courtroom through a speed deportation
program. Accordingly, it would be imprecise to conclude that the number of speed removals in the last
The author acknowledges earlier work by Jill Family examining “diversions” from immigration removal
proceedings and by Jennifer Lee Koh examining “stipulated removal” orders that enable a removal without a hearing.
See Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 595 (2009); Koh, supra note
5. However, these works do not dissect the speed deportation programs that are the subject of this Article.
7 JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
2013 5, Table 6, (Sept. 2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf.
8 Id. The number of removal orders issued by an immigration judge within EOIR may in fact be lower than
75,142, as this data does not categorize administrative removal orders for 2013. This inquiry, however, is beyond the
scope of this Article.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Email from John Simanski, Office of Immigration Statistics, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to author (Oct. 27,
2014, 9:11 EST) (on file with author).
12 The statistics from earlier years also reveal that the majority of individuals removed from the United States
underwent “speed deportation” through expedited removal or reinstatement, not administrative removal. For example,
data from 2011 shows that “[r]einstatements of final orders accounted for 130,000, or 33 percent, of all removals.
Expedited removals accounted for 123,000, or 31 percent, of all removals.” Data from 2010 shows that
“[r]einstatements of final orders accounted for 131,000, or 34 percent, of all removals. Expedited removals accounted
for 111,000, or 29 percent, of all removals.” OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, POLICY DIRECTORATE, ANNUAL
REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf.
6
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year served as a counterbalance to the growth in humanitarian programs like deferred action for childhood
arrivals (“DACA”),13 guidance documents on prosecutorial discretion,14 and other administrative
programs designed to protect people with equities from deportation through non-enforcement programs.
Data from prior to 2009 reveals different trends in removals.15 For example, in 2001, 38,943 individuals
were removed through reinstatement orders (compared to 149,000 in 2013).16 Moreover, DHS published
neither a definition for, nor data on, reinstatements from 2004-2008.17
This Article focuses on the discretion held by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to
place noncitizens legally eligible for speed removal into a complete court proceeding (“removal
proceedings”) before an immigration judge. “Prosecutorial discretion” identifies the authority for DHS
to decide whether and to what extent to enforce the immigration laws against a person or group of persons.
My interest in exploring the growth and consequences of speed removal is tied not only to my intellectual
journey into the role of prosecutorial discretion18 in immigration law but also to personal experience. In
Fall 2013, the clinic I direct at Penn State Law took on a pro bono case involving a man detained in York
County Prison who received an administrative removal order. Consequently, he was stripped of the
process and rights he might have otherwise been provided in a regular immigration court proceeding. Our
client had immediate family members who were United States citizens and, in our view, was wrongly
classified by DHS as an aggravated felon. Because his removal was predetermined by DHS through a
speed deportation program, he was not afforded the opportunity to challenge his removability or apply
for relief in removal proceedings. Instead, our client was issued a removal order and placed into a narrow
forum called “withholding only” proceedings, a forum described in greater detail below.

13 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-actionchildhood-arrivals-process (last visited March 10, 2014).
14 See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement to ICE
employees (Mar. 2, 2011) (available online at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf); see also Memorandum from John Morton,
Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement to ICE employees (June 17, 2011) (available online at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf); see also Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Reflections on Prosecutorial Discretion One Year After the Morton Memo, LEXISNEXIS IMMIGRATION LAW BLOG (June
14, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-lawblog/archive/2012/06/21/reflections-on-prosecutorial-discretion-in-immigration-context-1-year-after-the-mortonmemo.aspx.
15 For example, data from 2004 indicates a reduction in expedited removals from the previous year. Expedited
removals represented 21% of all formal removals in 2004. MARY DOUGHERTY ET AL., DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2004 1 (2005), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/AnnualReportEnforcement2004.pdf.
16 See id.
17 See Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/yearbookimmigration-statistics (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
18 See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration Remarks for the 10th Annual Wiley A. Branton Symposium, 57
HOW. L.J. 931 (2014); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred Action Cases at ICE,
27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345 (2013); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91
TEX. L. REV. 59 (2013); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the Role of the Judiciary
in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39 (2013); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010); SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, THE MORTON MEMO
AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: AN OVERVIEW (2011), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/specialreports/morton-memo-and-prosecutorial-discretion-overview; SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, READING THE MORTON
MEMO: FEDERAL PRIORITIES AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (2010), available at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/reading-morton-memo-federal-priorities-and-prosecutorialdiscretion.
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To facilitate the analysis of the programs analyzed for this Article and how they interact with
discretion generally, a short background of the history of U.S. immigration policy is in order. DHS is a
cabinet-level agency that was created after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.19 DHS is composed
of multiple sections, three of which play a robust role in immigration: Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”),20 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),21 and United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”).22 While both ICE and CBP play a significant role in apprehending and
processing noncitizens for removal,23 ICE bears responsibility for executing removal orders. In this way,
when ICE apprehends, detains, and processes noncitizens for speed removal, it serves as the police, jailor,
and judge.24
A second agency responsible for making decisions about deportation is the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”). Within DOJ is a unit called the EOIR, which itself is comprised of more than 250 immigration
judges and 59 immigration courts throughout the United States, as well as an administrative appellate
division known as the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).25 While an immigration judge or BIA
member is not herself independent from the Executive Branch or elected for an indefinite period like an
Article III judge,26 she functions like an administrative law judge and is bound by regulation to exercise
independent judgment when conducting proceedings.27 In 2013, immigration judges handled 193,350
cases, 187,677 of which were removal proceedings.28 Other case types heard by immigration judges
include: deportation proceedings, exclusion proceedings, and review of negative, credible, or reasonable
fear findings by the asylum officer, among other proceedings.29 Individuals in removal proceedings enjoy
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., http://www.cbp.gov/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
21 Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited
Mar. 10, 2014).
22 About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last visited Mar. 10,
2014).
23 See, e.g., FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
24 Only in the administrative removal process does the legal framework call for the arresting officer to be
different from the deciding officer. See INA § 238(b)(4)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4)(F) (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (defining
“deciding service officer” as “a district director, chief patrol agent, or another immigration officer designated by a district
director, chief patrol agent, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director
of the Office of Juvenile Affairs, so long as that person is not the same person as the Issuing Service Officer.”).
25 About, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
26 For a critique of the lack of independence of immigration judges and suggestions that the immigration
system reform and use Article III judges see Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635 (2010).
27 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b). (“In conducting hearings under section 240 of the Act and such other
proceedings the Attorney General may assign to them, immigration judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated
to them by the Act and by the Attorney General through regulation. In deciding the individual cases before them, and
subject to the applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and
discretion and may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and
necessary for the disposition of such cases.”). Likewise, since the immigration court system sits within DOJ, there is a
level of independence it has from ICE, which houses the attorneys responsible for defending the government in removal
proceedings. But attorneys who represent the government in federal court proceedings at which noncitizens challenge
final orders of removal are housed within DOJ in an office dubbed the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL). See
About, Office of Litigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/civil/office-immigration-litigation (last visited
Mar. 25, 2014).
28 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK B1
(2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy13syb.pdf.
29 Id. As summarized by the EOIR Yearbook, “deportation case” refers to “[a] case type initiated when the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] filed an Order to Show Cause with an immigration court before
19
20
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fundamental protections. Among the safeguards provided to such individuals are the right to counsel at
no expense to the government, the right to examine evidence, the right to present evidence and witnesses,
the right to cross-examine the government’s witnesses, the right to contest the allegations charged, the
right to apply for relief from removal, and the right to file an administrative appeal from a negative decision
by the immigration judge to the BIA.30 Individuals may be able to raise a due process challenge in removal
proceedings in federal court.31
II.

UNDERSTANDING SPEED DEPORTATION
A.

What is Speed Deportation?

For this Article, “speed deportation” refers to three programs operated by the Department of
Homeland Security to process and remove noncitizens without a hearing before an immigration judge.
These programs are creatures of Congress and are authorized in three provisions of the immigration statute
as: (1) expedited removal, (2) reinstatement, and (3) administrative removal. Expedited removal applies to
persons who arrive at a port-of-entry or within 100 miles of the border with fraudulent or insufficient
documents.32 Reinstatement applies to persons who “reenter” the United States without authorization
after having departed the United States voluntarily or under a previous removal order. The order of
removal is “reinstated” from the original date of the person’s original departure or removal order.33
Administrative removal applies to noncitizens who are not permanent residents of the United States and

April 1, 1997,” id. at 6; and “exclusion case” refers to “[a] case type involving a person who, before April 1, 1997, tried to
enter the United States but was stopped at the port of entry because the former [INS] found the person to be
inadmissible,” Id. A full description of these proceedings here is limited because they are not a focus of this Article.
30 INA § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(4) (2014).
31 See, e.g., Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.2001) (“[A]liens facing removal are entitled to due
process, which includes opportunity to make arguments on their own behalf”); see also Leslie v. Attorney Gen. of U.S.,
611 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Aliens in removal proceedings are entitled to Fifth Amendment Due Process
protection, which guarantees them a fundamentally fair removal hearing.”). It should be pointed out that “regular”
removal proceedings have been criticized by scholars and advocates for lacking the safeguards available to defendants in
criminal proceedings, in part, because the former are considered “civil.” For a greater discussion on this topic, see Juliet
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006); Stephen H.
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469
(2007); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 289 (2008).
32 See INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2013) (providing that “[i]f an immigration officer
determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph (F)) who is arriving in the United States or is
described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), the officer shall order the alien removed
from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for
asylum under section 208 or a fear of persecution.”); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3. See also SIMANSKI, supra note 7, at 2 (defining
“expedited removal” as “removal without a hearing before an immigration judge of an alien arriving in the United States
who is inadmissible because the individual does not possess valid entry documents or is inadmissible for fraud or
misrepresentation of material fact; or the removal of an alien who has not been admitted or paroled in the United States
and who has not affirmatively shown to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien had been physically
present in the United States for the immediately preceding 2-year period (INA § 235(b)(1)(A)).”).
33 See INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2013) (providing that “[i]f the Attorney General finds that an alien
has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of
removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed,
the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and the alien shall be removed under the prior
order at any time after the reentry”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.8; SIMANSKI, supra note 7, at 2 (defining reinstatement of
“final removal orders” as “[t]he removal of an alien on the reinstatement of a prior removal order, where the alien
departed the United States under an order of removal and illegally re-entered the United States (INA § 241(a)(5)). The
alien may be removed without a hearing before an immigration judge.”).
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have been classified by DHS as convicted of an aggravated felony.34 One complication is defining
“aggravated felony.” Currently, the immigration code (hereinafter, “INA”) lists more than one dozen
categories for aggravated felony35 including: theft offenses, crimes of violence, drug trafficking, murder,
and fraud offenses involving at least a $10,000 loss to the victim.36 The next section discusses the
procedural protections and substantive remedies that do attach to speed deportation.
B.

Procedural Requirements and Speed Deportation37

In theory, the procedural safeguards included in the statute and regulations for reinstatement of
removal, expedited removal, and administrative removal contains more “process” than other deportation
schemes such as the stipulated removal order program38 and those subject to in absentia orders of removal.39
Moreover, the legal framework for speed deportation enables a party to challenge his speed removal in a
federal court. The procedural safeguards associated with speed deportation are detailed in this section.
Practically speaking, however, noncitizens face significant hurdles, including the short period one has to
challenge removal, and the inability to obtain evidence, understand the nature of the charges, or secure
counsel.
1.

Reinstatement of Removal

Under the reinstatement regulations, DHS is required to make the following findings: whether (1)
the alien was subject to a prior order of removal, (2) the alien is the same person as the one named in the
prior order, and (3) the alien unlawfully reentered the country.40 In making a determination about whether
the individual has unlawfully entered, the regulations require that DHS “consider all relevant evidence,
including statements made by the alien and any evidence in the alien's possession. The immigration officer
shall attempt to verify an alien's claim, if any, that he or she was lawfully admitted, which shall include a
check of Service data systems available to the officer.”41 Procedurally, the reinstatement of removal process
34 See INA § 238(b)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1449(b)(1)-(2) (2013) (providing that “(1) The Attorney General may, in
the case of an alien described in paragraph (2), determine the deportability of such alien under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(relating to conviction of an aggravated felony) and issue an order of removal pursuant to the procedures set forth in this
subsection or section 240. (2) An alien is described in this paragraph if the alien- (A) was not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence at the time at which proceedings under this section commenced; or (B) had permanent resident
status on a conditional basis (as described in section 216) at the time that proceedings under this section commenced.”);
8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(1); INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2013). See also SIMANSKI, supra note 7, at 2 (defining
“Administrative Removal” as “[t]he removal of an alien not admitted for permanent residence, or of an alien admitted
for permanent residence on a conditional basis pursuant to section 216 of the INA, under a DHS order based on the
determination that the individual has been convicted of an aggravated felony (INA § 238(b)(1)). The alien may be
removed without a hearing before an immigration judge.”).
35 INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2013).
36 See id.
37 Outside the scope of this Article but worthy of a mention is the extent to which a person can challenge a
decision by DHS to place a person in speed removal under administrative law. Possibly, the decision made by DHS to
place a person in administrative removal or reinstatement is an arbitrary one in which the officer can either a) place the
same individual in a full removal proceeding, at which she can apply for any form of relief from removal before an
immigration judge, or b) issue an administrative or reinstatement of removal order at which the best she can hope for if
she has passed her “reasonable fear” interview before an asylum officer is mandatory withholding or Convention Against
Torture protection. This argument is propelled by the fact that neither the statute nor the regulations contain guidance
on how, or the circumstances under which, DHS should elect between placing a person in speed deportation or issuing
and filing an NTA to commence removal proceedings.
38 INA § 240(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b); see also, Koh, supra note 5.
39 INA § 240(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (2013); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26 (defining in absentia hearings).
40 See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(1)-(3).
41 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(3).
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commences when a DHS officer provides the noncitizen with a written notice of his determination.42 The
regulations require DHS to provide a noncitizen with written notice of its decision if it determines that the
noncitizen is subject to reinstatement. DHS must also advise the noncitizen about his ability to contest a
reinstatement finding and reconsider his decision if a challenge is made.43 Additionally, the regulations
require that individuals who express fear of persecution upon return be referred to an asylum officer for
additional screening.44 Furthermore, another section of the regulations, outside of those that govern
reinstatement of removal, clarifies that any person who is subject to an “examination” (which would
include reinstatement of removal) has a right to counsel.45
While the regulations that govern reinstatement cases are seemingly long, the actual amount of
time needed for removal is sometimes short. Professor Lee J. Terán has noted, “[in] most cases,
particularly involving Mexicans arrested near the U.S./Mexico border, the process of reinstatement of
removal can be completed in a matter of hours.”46 Though the regulations provide an internal procedure
for challenging speed deportation, a noncitizen’s inability to appeal a removal order to a neutral third party
(an immigration judge or BIA) is troubling.47
Individuals who receive a reinstatement order may challenge its legality in a federal court of appeals
through a legal vehicle called a “petition for review.” The statutory language that governs judicial review
states that a “petition for review” is the exclusive means of review for final orders of removal.48 A petition
for review must be filed within 30 days after a reinstatement of removal order becomes final. Under the
statute, a petition for review “shall be filed with the court of appeals of the judicial circuit in which the
immigration judge completed the proceedings.”49 This creates ambiguity for people in reinstatement
because those orders are unilaterally issued by DHS. Therefore, reinstatement orders do not involve
immigration judges unless the person is in reasonable fear proceedings, which as detailed in the following
section, are triggered only after a person has been found to have a “reasonable fear” of persecution or
torture. Moreover, even the order underlying a reinstatement order may have been issued by DHS rather
than by an immigration judge. Some federal courts have rejected procedural due process challenges to
reinstatement of removal orders.50
While it may be true that judicial review is available for those who wish to challenge a final order
of removal following a reinstatement of removal order, in reality the statutory limitations and practical
impediments to filing a petition to review in a circuit court make such review difficult. For example, the
person may be unfamiliar with his options for federal court review before he is deported because he lacks
counsel, information, or the will to remain in detention to fight his case. Moreover, many of the forms
associated with speed deportation are in English and also lack information about the availability of judicial
review. Lastly, filing a petition for review does not automatically “stay” a person’s deportation, so DHS
can execute a removal order notwithstanding a timely filed petition for review.
8 C.F.R. § 241.8(b).
Id.
44 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e).
45 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b).
46 Lee. J. Terán, Mexican Children of U.S. Citizens: “Vignes Prin” and Other Tales of Challenges to Asserting Acquired
U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR 583, 661 (2012). In 2013, 75% of all reinstatements were applied to nationals of Mexico.
See SIMANSKI, supra note 7.
47 See, e.g., INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2013).
48 INA § 242(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2013).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 496 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We are satisfied, moreover, that
the [reinstatement] regulation provides sufficient procedural safeguards to withstand a facial challenge for patent
procedural insufficiency.”).
42
43
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Administrative Removal

The statutory language that governs administrative removal requires DHS to provide an individual
with reasonable notice of the charges, notice of his right to be represented by counsel at no expense to the
government, the right to inspect, examine and rebut evidence, and service of the record in person or by
mail, among other requirements.51 The regulations for administrative removal proceedings also contain
important requirements. Administrative removal proceedings commence when a noncitizen is served with
a charging document called the “Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order.”52 This
Notice includes information about the grounds for removal, the ability for a noncitizen to seek counsel at
no expense to the government, the opportunity to apply for withholding of removal if he fears persecution
or torture in his country of removal, and the ability to challenge his 238(b) classification.53 This Notice
must also be accompanied by a list of free local legal services. In the absence of a challenge by the
noncitizen, or if DHS finds that the noncitizen’s rebuttal lacks a genuine issue affecting its findings of
removability, the removal order is executed within 14 days unless the 14 day period is waived.54 Likewise,
administrative removal orders require a supervisor to finalize the order.55 If DHS ultimately finds that a
noncitizen is not properly subject to administrative removal, an officer can terminate the administrative
removal proceedings and place the individual in “regular” removal proceedings by issuing a Notice to
Appear.56 DHS is required to refer individuals to an asylum officer for additional screening if such
individuals request to apply for protection under withholding of removal.57
Like with reinstatement, individuals who face an administrative removal order may file a “petition
for review” within 30 days after an administrative removal order becomes final. Notably, judicial review is
specifically mentioned in the statutory provision that governs administrative removal. Specifically, the
statute requires a record be “maintained for judicial review.”58 With respect to those otherwise precluded
from seeking judicial review because of a statutory bar (such as a person found removable because of an
aggravated felony), the immigration statute preserves jurisdiction for claims involving legal questions and
constitutional claims.59 Nevertheless, the practical impediments faced by those in administrative removal
are similar to the reinstatement context insofar as they may lack the information about judicial review.
Also, since the timeline for administrative removal is a short one (14 days), the likelihood is very high that
people are wrongfully removed before a court of law can conclude that a particular crime is not, in fact,
an aggravated felony.
3.

Expedited Removal

In the expedited removal process, a DHS officer should advise the noncitizen of the charges
against him in writing and provide him with an opportunity to respond.60 Like with administrative removal,
expedited removal orders are entered by a DHS examining officer after they have been approved by a

INA § 238(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4) (2013).
8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(2).
53 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b).
54 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d), (f).
55 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(a), (d).
56 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)(iii).
57 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(f).
58 INA § 238(b)(4)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4)(E) (2013).
59 INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2013).
60 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).
51
52
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supervisor.61 If a noncitizen who is subject to expedited removal indicates a fear of return to his home
country, then DHS shall record this information and provide the noncitizen with a written description of
the “credible fear” interview process, notice of the right to consult with others before the interview, and
other information.62 Verified lawful permanent residents, refugees, asylees, or United States citizens, may
not be removed pursuant to expedited removal. The regulations contain a narrow procedure for handling
related claims.63 For example, when someone in expedited removal claims to be a United States citizen,
the claim must be heard by an immigration judge in a proceeding called “claimed status review.”64
In expedited removal cases, judicial review is limited to habeas corpus challenges based on status
claims, such as whether the individual is a citizen, lawful permanent resident, asylee, or refugee and whether
the person was ordered removed.65
C.

Can Those Subject to Speed Deportation Seek a Remedy?

Importantly, a fraction of individuals subject to expedited removal, administrative removal, or
reinstatement of removal may have the opportunity to apply for protection from harm before an
immigration court. This outcome is limited, however, to those who are able to convince an asylum officer
that their fear of persecution or torture is “reasonable” if the person is subject to reinstatement or
administrative removal or “credible” if the person is subject to expedited removal.66 If an asylum officer
within USCIS concludes that an arriving asylum seeker subject to expedited removal has a “credible fear”
of persecution or torture in her home country, then she will fill out the requisite worksheet and file the
necessary paperwork with the immigration court to initiate a regular removal hearing at which she can
apply for asylum, withholding of removal and/or protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”) before an immigration judge.67 Individuals who pass their credible fear interview are served with
a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and placed into formal removal proceedings once the NTA is filed with the
immigration court.68 In this way, asylum seekers who ordinarily may have been subject to expedited
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7).
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4).
63 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5).
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., Smith v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 741 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2014).
66 See 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(f)(3) (“Withholding of removal. If the alien has requested withholding of removal under §
208.16 of this chapter, the deciding officer shall, upon issuance of a Final Administrative Removal Order, immediately
refer the alien's case to an asylum officer to conduct a reasonable fear determination in accordance with § 208.31 of this
chapter.”); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e) (“Exception for withholding of removal. If an alien whose prior order of removal has been
reinstated under this section expresses a fear of returning to the country designated in that order, the alien shall be
immediately referred to an asylum officer for an interview to determine whether the alien has a reasonable fear of
persecution or torture pursuant to § 208.31 of this chapter.”); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (“Claim of asylum or fear of persecution or
torture. If an alien subject to the expedited removal provisions indicates an intention to apply for asylum, or expresses a
fear of persecution or torture, or a fear of return to his or her country, the inspecting officer shall not proceed further
with removal of the alien until the alien has been referred for an interview by an asylum officer in accordance with 8
CFR 208.30. The examining immigration officer shall record sufficient information in the sworn statement to establish
and record that the alien has indicated such intention, fear, or concern, and to establish the alien's inadmissibility.”)
67 INA§ 235(b)(1)(B)(v); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2014) (“Credible fear of persecution defined: For
purposes of this subparagraph, the term ‘credible fear of persecution’ means that there is a significant possibility, taking
into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are
known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum . . . . ”); 8 C.F.R. § 235.6 (“Referral to
Immigration Judge”).
68 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 235.6(a)(1)(ii) (specifying that an immigration officer or asylum officer will sign and deliver
a Form I-862 to an alien “if an asylum officer determines that an alien in expedited removal proceedings has a credible
fear of persecution or torture and refers the case to the immigration judge for consideration of the application for
asylum.”); 8 C.F.R § 208.30(f) (“Procedures for a positive credible fear finding. If an alien, other than an alien stowaway, is
61
62
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removal are instead placed into standard court proceedings accompanied with the variety of procedural
safeguards described earlier.
Persons subject to administrative removal or reinstatement who indicate a fear of persecution or
torture in their home country must be given a “reasonable fear”69 interview before an asylum officer, and,
if successful, are placed in a limited proceeding known as a “withholding-only” proceeding.70 During a
“withholding-only” proceeding, a person may apply for relief through a traditional form of withholding of
removal and protection under the CAT. The governing statutes stipulate that individuals with a final
administrative removal order or reinstatement are ineligible for any other kind of relief from removal.71
The agency has opined that, as a matter of law, the statutory prohibition on relief is consistent with the
availability of withholding of removal or CAT relief because “they are merely restrictions on the place to
which an alien may be removed and do not constitute affirmative permission to remain in the United
States.”72
The regulations further implement these statutory bars to relief by providing that individuals in
withholding-only proceedings are precluded from applying for other forms of relief from removal that
might ordinarily be available to someone in regular removal proceedings, such as adjustment of status,
cancellation of removal, or asylum.73 Traditional withholding of removal requires an individual to prove
a clear probability of persecution by the government or an actor the government is unable or unwilling to
control because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.74
By contrast, the CAT requires an individual to prove a likelihood of torture by the government or with the
found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture, the asylum officer will so inform the alien and issue a Form I862, Notice to Appear, for full consideration of the asylum and withholding of removal claim in proceedings under
section 240 of the Act.”).
69 8 C.F.R. § 208.31 (“Reasonable fear of persecution or torture determinations involving aliens ordered
removed under section 238(b) of the Act and aliens whose removal is reinstated under section 241(a)(5) of the Act. . . .
The alien shall be determined to have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if the alien establishes a reasonable
possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of
removal. For purposes of the screening determination, the bars to eligibility for withholding of removal under section
241(b)(3)(B) of the Act shall not be considered . . . . ”). The USCIS website has a concise fact sheet on the reasonable
fear screening process. See Asylum, Questions and Answers: Reasonable Fear Screening Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-reasonablefear-screenings (last updated June 18, 2013).
70 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 208.31 (“Reasonable fear of persecution or torture determinations involving aliens
ordered removed under section 238(b) of the Act and aliens whose removal is reinstated under section 241(a)(5) of the
Act”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c) (“The alien shall be determined to have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if
the alien establishes a reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would
be tortured in the country of removal.”).
71 See INA § 238(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(5) (2013) (“No alien described in this section shall be eligible for any
relief from removal that the Attorney General may grant in the Attorney General's discretion.”); INA § 241(a)(5); 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2014) (“If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after
having been removed . . . the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being
reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and the alien shall be
removed the prior order at any time after the reentry.”).
72 See Memorandum from John Torres, Acting Director for Office of Detention and Removal Operations of
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to Field Office Directors, Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field
Manual Update, Chapter 1 (March 27, 2006) (on file with author).
73 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(g)(1)(i) (“The immigration judge shall consider only the alien's application for
withholding of removal under § 208.16 and shall determine whether the alien's removal to the country of removal must
be withheld or deferred.”).
74 INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2014); 8 C.F.R § 208.16 (2000).
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acquiescence of the government.75 Both forms of relief place the burden on an applicant to prove eligibility
for relief and are adjudicated by an individual judge following an adversarial proceeding. Like with a regular
immigration court proceeding, individuals in withholding-only proceedings have the right to examine and
rebut evidence offered by the government, and be represented by counsel at their own expense.76 It is
plausible that Congress removed the possibility for individuals subject to speed deportation programs to
apply for additional relief under the theory that some people are less deserving of a full day in court. United
States immigration law is comprised of staggered safeguards reflecting policy choices by Congress about
who is worthy of protection.77
While the legal framework that governs noncitizens subject to reinstatement or administrative
removal suggests that noncitizens who have expressed a reasonable fear may only apply for withholding
of removal and relief under the CAT, there is a strong argument that such applicants can still apply for
asylum. The asylum statute specifically affirms that “any alien . . . irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply
for asylum.”78 Thus, the plain text of the statute would make the limits discussed above immaterial because
the statute is unambiguous that “any alien” has the right to apply for asylum. Notably, the American
Immigration Lawyers Association (“AILA”) and refugee rights litigants have argued, “The reinstatement
regulations limiting protection from persecution to withholding of removal must be struck down . . . .”79
The impact of barring asylum in this way is significant and potentially contravenes the United States’
obligations under international law.80 One story featured by AILA in a related amicus brief involved
“Mirabel” a woman from Honduras who was ordered removed in 2001:
Mirabel returned to Honduras where she became romantically involved
with a man who became abusive after she moved in with him. He isolated
and confined her to his home and raped her over and over again. He tied
her up and permitted his friends to gang rape her. In one incident, after
torturing her, he forced her to cook for his friends. When she did not
perform to his liking, he broke a beer bottle, cut her, and beat her until
she fell unconscious. After Mirabel’s abuser left her for dead, she escaped
to Mexico. While there, Mirabel bumped into one of her abuser’s friends
who had raped her. He told Mirabel that her former boyfriend was
looking for her to finish the job of killing her. Mirabel then sought refuge
8 C.F.R. § 208.17-18.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(e), 208.16; see also EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL 119, (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_1-2714.pdf#page=119.
77 For a broader examination of other “diversions” in the immigration system, see Jill E. Family, A Broader View
of the Immigration Adjudication Program, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009). For an analysis about narratives told about
“good” immigrants versus “bad” immigrants, see Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New
Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012).
78 See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
79 Brief of Amicus for American Immigration Lawyers Association, et al., at 6, Maldonado-Lopez v. Holder
(No. 12-72800), AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 13080204 (posted Feb. 8, 2013) available at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=45288; see also Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 n.4
(2006) (“Notwithstanding the absolute terms in which the bar on relief is stated, even an alien subject to §241(a)(5) may
seek withholding of removal under 8 U. S. C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000 ed.) (noting that an alien may not be removed to
country if “the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”), or under 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(e), 208.31 (raising
the possibility of asylum to aliens whose removal order has been reinstated under INA §241(a)(5))”).
80 See INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2014), which incorporates the international law principle of nonrefoulement articulated in The Convention on the Status of Refugees. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
Art. 33, July 8 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
75
76
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in the United States, where the Government reinstated her prior removal
order. Although an asylum officer reached a positive “reasonable fear”
determination, Mirabel is now in “withholding only” proceedings in
which she will not even be considered for asylum.81
Although a full discussion about the differences between asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
are beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that a person granted asylum receives a more secure
status, the ability to include their spouse and children as derivatives, and the possibility to eventually obtain
lawful permanent residence (green card) and citizenship.82 None of these benefits are available to a person
who is granted withholding of removal or CAT. Likewise, the BIA has articulated that a grant of
withholding of removal requires an explicit order of removal, further indicating that, as a legal matter, this
form of protection operates as a restriction on where a person may be removed and not as permission to
remain in the United States indefinitely.83
Statistics from the EOIR are not entirely clear about the number of regular removal proceedings
that originated from the expedited removal process but reveal that immigration courts received 2,269
withholding-only84 proceedings in fiscal year 2013.85 Again, these proceedings refer to those individuals
who were found to have a “reasonable fear of persecution or torture” by the asylum officer or the
immigration judge (following an appeal of a negative reasonable fear finding by the asylum officer) after
an administrative removal order or reinstatement order.
While withholding-only hearings make up only a small fraction of the overall caseload untaken by
EOIR each year, the growth of such hearings is notable. According to the EOIR Statistical Yearbook for
2013, the immigration court received 240 withholding-only proceedings in 2009, 497 proceedings in 2010,
886 proceedings in 2011, 1,090 proceedings in 2012, and 2,269 proceedings in 2013.86 On the one hand,
Brief of Amicus for American Immigration Lawyers Association, et al., supra note 79, at 1-2.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACTSHEET: ASYLUM AND
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE PROTECTIONS, 6 (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf.
83 See Matter of I-S- & C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432 (BIA 2008) (“When an Immigration Judge issues a decision
granting an alien’s application for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000), without a grant of asylum, the decision must include an explicit order of removal.”); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, EOIR Benchbook Alert (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/alerts/alert_wr.htm.
84 For statistical purposes, EOIR considers “withholding only proceedings” as part of the overall “immigration
matters” it handles in a given fiscal year. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FY2012 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW C2-C3 (2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf. Likewise, the EOIR statistical yearbook for 2012 states “A
withholding only hearing is initiated when the following conditions have been met:
 A previous removal/deportation/exclusion order has been reinstated by DHS or the alien has been
ordered removed (administratively) by DHS (based upon a conviction for an aggravated felony) and the alien expresses a
fear of persecution or torture if returned to the country of removal and that claim is reviewed by an asylum officer, and
 An asylum officer has concluded that the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture or an
immigration judge conducted a reasonable fear review proceeding and found that reasonable fear of persecution or
torture exists, OR
 An alien who is an applicant for admission to Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI) under the Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act or who was admitted to Guam or the CNMI under the Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program and has violated their
conditions of admission is subject to withholding only proceedings prior to January 1, 2015.”
85 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK B1
(2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy13syb.pdf.
86 Id.
81
82
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the growth in numbers may indicate that DHS is doing a better job at screening people subject to
reinstatement or administrative removal who express a fear of persecution or torture, or that more people
in these categories have facts that are more likely to lead to a reasonable fear finding. On the other hand,
and more likely given the trend of increased speed deportations, the growth in withholding-only hearings
may be tied to the growth in reinstatements and administrative removals by DHS. This growth in
reinstatements and administrative removals may be associated with a change of policy, under which DHS
will now divert into a speed removal program people who might have ordinarily been issued a Notice to
Appear and placed in removal proceedings before an immigration judge. Whether this increase in
withholding-only hearings is unlawful may be hard to pin down as “arbitrary.” People with similar facts
and backgrounds can just as easily be given a formal 240 removal hearing or instead, be placed in a
truncated withholding-only proceeding after being ordered removed and then passing a reasonable fear
interview. Perhaps the growth reflects a policy choice by DHS to effectuate removals with more efficiency
and reach a certain number of removals. The next section examines the policy and politics of these
programs in more detail.
III.

THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF SPEED DEPORTATION

To examine the legitimacy of speed deportation programs as a policy matter, this section considers
1) the personal interest of the noncitizen subject to speed deportation; 2) the risk of error, and value of
additional procedural safeguards; and 3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative
burdens of more procedures.87
A.

Personal Interests Affected by Deportation

Some might take a position that the personal interests are low in the case of a first-time visitor to
the United States facing expedited removal. Likewise, some may argue that individuals who enter the
United States without inspection or after a previous removal (reinstatement) are not entitled to personal
ties to the United States because they have violated the law.88 Moreover, others may argue that since
administrative removal is aimed at persons who are not lawful permanent residents of the United States
and who have been found to have an aggravated felony conviction, the interest is low. But these positions
are less attractive if a person is fleeing persecution or torture, entering the United States to reunite with a
family member, or otherwise eligible for relief from removal. As a policy matter, my view is that personal
interests should not be measured by a person’s manner of entry, immigration status, or even criminal
history as the individual stakes of nonjudicial deportation are all too high.
The human consequences of speed deportation cannot be underestimated. It can result in the
forced expulsion of people who bear strong equities like tender age, community ties, intellectual promise,
and family members who are United States citizens. The legal framework that governs speed removal
does not contain exceptions for individuals who have other equities or even eligibility for a benefit like
adjustment of status through marriage to a United States citizen or sponsorship by a United States
employer. Imagine the case of Eduardo, an undocumented worker from Chile who enters the United
States as a student at University X, violates the term of his visa by working without authorization, and is
convicted once for a misdemeanor crime that qualifies as an “aggravated felony.” Thereafter, Eduardo
meets and falls in love with a friend from University X who was born in the United States and, together,
they decide to marry in a church ceremony. Eduardo is viewed as a caring father and husband and
87 This section loosely follows the due process balancing test/standard set up in Matthew v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) for considering the policy and politics of speed deportation but it should be noted that the author does not
intend to use Mathews to question the constitutionality of speed deportation programs.
88 David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal, 40 VA. J. OF INT’L. L. 673, 690 (2000).
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volunteer in his community. Under the immigration law, Eduardo can be arrested and placed in
“administrative removal” based on his criminal history and then removed within 14 days of the final
removal order.89 The administrative removal scheme does not exempt people like Eduardo who are
married to a United States citizen or a father to a United States citizen. The troubling aspect of this
statutory scheme is two-fold: it prevents Eduardo from seeing an immigration judge or undergoing
removal proceedings before he is removed, and it categorically bars him from any immigration relief for
which he might otherwise qualify, such as adjustment of status.
As was analyzed earlier in the context of the administrative removal statute, the reinstatement
statute prevents individuals, thousands of whom may have no criminal history at all, from seeking relief
before an immigration judge. The act of someone leaving the United States after a removal order and then
coming back into the United States without admission might be grave enough to make the reinstatement
sound reasonable. The challenge is that these same individuals may be otherwise law-abiding but still
choose to enter unlawfully in order to reunite with their family, flee from persecution, leave a poverty state,
or access medical care for a serious condition. Individuals who bear these equities should have the
opportunity to present them to an immigration judge—as opposed to a DHS officer—and apply for relief
for which they are eligible (based on these equities) before deportation.
B.

Risk of Error and Value of Additional Safeguards

This section explores the possibility that DHS will erroneously place a person in a speed
deportation program and the extent to which adding safeguards would reduce this error. These errors can
take many forms. For example, if DHS mistakenly executes an expedited removal order to a lawful
permanent resident or issues an administrative removal order to a noncitizen who was convicted of a crime
that does not qualify as an aggravated felony. If there is a significant risk of error under the existing
framework, the next question is whether additional procedural safeguards can prevent or minimize this
risk. The existing statutory and regulatory framework arguably contains enough process to minimize the
risk of error. If adding more procedure does not reduce the risk of erroneous deportation, there may be
room to argue that speed deportation programs should be dissolved altogether.90
1.

Agency Expertise

Related to the analysis about the possibility for mistakenly placing people in speed deportation is
whether DHS has the proficiency to screen and determine that a person is legally subject to speed
deportation. Arguably, if DHS lacks the expertise to make determinations associated with expedited
removal, reinstatement, or administrative removal, the risk of error is greater. To illustrate, DHS may issue
an expedited removal order to any noncitizen who arrives without documentation or with false
documentation if he or she expresses a fear of return based on persecution or torture.91 While officers of
DHS are trained to assess verbal and behavioral cues that might indicate a person may fear harm in her
home country, only a small percentage of individuals subject to expedited removal are referred to an asylum
officer for a credible fear interview. According to DHS, “From FY 2000 through FY 2009, the annual
percentage of individuals subject to expedited removal who expressed a fear of return ranged from 4-6%.
8 CFR § 1238.1(f)(1) (2003) (“Upon the issuance of a Final Administrative Removal Order, the Service shall
issue a Warrant of Removal in accordance with §1241.2 of this chapter; such warrant shall be executed no sooner than
14 calendar days after the date the Final Administrative Removal Order is issued, unless the alien knowingly, voluntarily,
and in writing waives the 14-day period.”).
90 On the other hand, one may argue that such programs need not be perfect to be rational and that mistakenly
removing some people in order to operate a streamlined deportation program is a legitimate end.
91 See INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2013).
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From FY 2010 through FY 2012, the annual percentage ranged from 7-9%.”92 The low rate of referrals
may be tied to the actual number of arriving noncitizens who qualify for referral to an asylum officer for
a credible fear interview. But a second possibility is that DHS is turning away legitimate asylum seekers
because of a lack of information or expertise to assess the cues appropriate for such referral. One study
from 2005 conducted by the United States Commission for International Religion Freedom found that in
“nearly 15 percent of the cases which Study experts observed directly and in person, asylum seekers who
expressed a fear of return were nevertheless removed without a referral to an Asylum Officer. Of those
cases, nearly half of the files indicated that the asylum seeker had not expressed any fear.”93 More recently,
American Immigration Council published a report detailing the state of credible fear and asylum
procedures, and reported, “We heard frequent complains that CBP officers often dissuade people from
seeking asylum, sometimes berating and yelling at them. Some advocates complained that clients were
harassed, threatened with separation from their families or long detentions, or told that their fears did not
amount to asylum claims.”94 According to one Florida non-profit attorney featured in the Council’s report,
“CBP doesn’t do its job and ask the right questions about fear of return. People are removed under
expedited removal and then come right back because they are afraid. Then they are only eligible for a
reasonable fear interview and withholding of removal and detained for a long time.”95 This anecdote sheds
light not only on the possibility that CBP may erroneously deport noncitizens instead of making referrals
to asylum officers for credible fear interviews, but also displays how the different speed deportation
programs interact with one another. In the aforementioned example, individuals are initially issued an
expedited removal order, and, upon return, may qualify only for a reasonable fear interview because they
are then subject to a reinstated order. As a final illustration of public concern around the referral process,
the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) circulated a survey to its membership soliciting
examples of “individuals who were apprehended by CBP after crossing into the U.S. and issued expedited
removal orders without the opportunity for a credible fear interview when the individual clearly expressed
fear to the officer or was not asked about a fear of return at all.”96 Presumably, this survey suggests
dissatisfaction with the quality of CBP’s screening process for genuine refugees who face expedited
removal. There is less concrete evidence about the quality of DHS referrals of noncitizens reinstatement
or administrative removal orders to an asylum officer after they express a fear of persecution or torture.
Part of the ambiguity is tied to the practical reality that many pro bono attorneys do not interface with this
population until after they have passed their reasonable fear interviews.97
To offer a second example about the experience level of DHS officers who make removal
decisions, the regulations that govern reinstatement of removal permit DHS to summarily remove “[a]n
alien who illegally reenters the United States after having been removed, or having departed voluntarily,

Asylum Abuse: Is It Overwhelming Our Borders?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 39
(written testimony of USCIS Deputy Director Scialabba, ICE Deputy Director Daniel Ragsdale, CBP Office of Border
Patrol Chief Michael Fisher).
93 UNITED STATES COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EXPEDITED REMOVAL REPORT CARD: 2 YEARS
LATER 4 (2007), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/scorecard_final.pdf.
94 SARA CAMPOS & JOAN FRIEDLAND, MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN ASYLUM AND CREDIBLE FEAR
CLAIMS: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 10 (May 21, 2014), available at
http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/docs/asylum_and_credible_fear_claims_final.pdf.
95 Id. at 10.
96 AILA Seeks Examples of CBP Denying Individuals Access to Credible Fear Interviews, AILA INFONET,
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=484114 (last visited May 16, 2014).
97 FLORENCE IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RIGHTS PROJECT, GUIDE TO CREDIBLE & REASONABLE FEAR
PROCEEDINGS 5 (2013), available at http://www.firrp.org/media/CF-RF-Guide-2013.pdf (noting that “[i]f you are
waiting for a credible or reasonable fear interview you will probably not see the Florence Project until you pass and are
waiting for your first hearing.”).
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while under an order . . . .”98 However, the question of whether an entry is “lawful” or whether the
procedural safeguards spelled out in the regulations are being followed are legally complex and may indicate
that trained judges are better suited to analyze each element of the reinstatement statute. In one case,
Cardova-Soto v. Holder, a federal judge found that a noncitizen who returned to the United States following
a removal order as a backseat passenger in a taxi after presenting herself at the port-of-entry was still
making an “illegal entry” for reinstatement purposes.99 Cardova-Soto entered the United States as an
infant and eventually became a lawful permanent resident at the age of 13. She worked in fast food
restaurants in order to support her family and eventually received a high school degree equivalent. Because
of her prior conviction for drug possession, however, she was placed in removal proceedings and ordered
to be removed based on this activity through a stipulated order of removal. Cardova-Soto returned to the
United States without authorization in order to reunite with her four United States citizen children and
her husband, also a United States citizen.100 While the court ultimately found that reinstatement applied,
it analyzed a body of case law before making a determination that the reinstatement statute could be applied
to a procedurally regular entry.101
As a third example, errors can take place during the administrative removal process. To recap,
administrative removal applies to individuals who are neither citizens nor green card holders and have
been convicted of an aggravated felony.102 In other words, administrative removal applies to someone
who is in the United States with a temporary or undocumented status and has a criminal history. While
the aggravated felony list is a broad one, the analysis is complicated by the fact that state, federal, and
foreign offenses may qualify as “aggravated felonies.” Importantly, an officer or judge cannot make a
decision about whether a criminal conviction qualifies for deportation without analyzing the statute under
which the noncitizen was convicted. Under the “categorical approach,” adjudicators are to look “not to
the facts of the particular prior case,” but instead to whether “the state statute defining the crime of
conviction” categorically fits within the “generic” federal definition of a corresponding aggravated
felony.103 Even immigration judges, BIA members, and federal court judges reach legally questionable
conclusions that in several cases have resulted in a reversal by the United States Supreme Court.104 For
example, in Moncrieffe v. Holder, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and the BIA and found that
a conviction for marijuana possession with intent to distribute under a Georgia statute may not be deemed
a drug trafficking aggravated felony for immigration purposes.105 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
compared the elements of the Georgia statute with the Controlled Substance Act, the federal statute
referenced in the aggravated felony definition for drug trafficking. Because the Georgia statute is broad
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a).
732 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2013).
100 See id.
101 Id. For an analysis of the Cordova-Soto case and how the reinstatement of removal order stemmed from a
stipulated removal order, see Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1864-18667 (2014).
102 See INA § 238(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1449(b)(1) (1952).
103 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-600 (1990); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
104 See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (holding that possession with intent to distribute was
not necessarily a felony because a conviction under state law did not consider possible exceptions for small amounts of
marijuana possessed without remuneration); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 550 U.S. 563 (2010) (holding that a second
conviction for simple possession could not be an aggravated felony because the noncitizen was charged with a
misdemeanor under state law and it was inappropriate for immigration courts to enhance the conviction ex post facto);
Watson v. U.S., 552 U.S. 74 (2007) (holding that under a plain English reading of the law, a noncitizen who traded drugs
for a gun could not be convicted of a felony for “using” a gun during a drug trafficking crime); Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549
U.S. 47 (2006) (determining that a drug offense that was a felony under state law but only a misdemeanor under federal
law was not an aggravated felony); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (finding that because state law classified DUIs
as having a mens rea of negligence or less, it was inappropriate for the lower court to classify those DUIs as “crimes of
violence”, and thereby find the noncitizen guilty of an aggravated felony).
105 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. 1678.
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enough to punish conduct involving a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, the Court reasoned
that it could not qualify as an aggravated felony as the Controlled Substance Act contains an “exception”
for cases involving a small amount and no remuneration. Arguably, and as a result of Moncrieffe, anyone
administratively removed pursuant to a state conviction similar to the Georgia statute in which there is an
element of “possession with intent to distribute” but no element of remuneration or any minimum quantity
of marijuana may not qualify as an aggravated felon.106 Thus, an important question is whether the DHS,
as opposed to a judge, should determine whether a person is an aggravated felon. The examples above
illustrate the complex analysis involved in applying expedited removal, reinstatement, and administrative
removal, and also raise legitimate concerns about sustaining a paradigm in which people can be removed
without any process or regular court proceeding.
As a final example, it is possible that speed deportation programs, where the screening is limited
and the deportation timeline immediate, increase the chances that DHS will mistakenly deport a United
States citizen. Scholars have identified the legal and factual complication of citizenship, especially when
one is claiming derivative citizenship, citizenship by acquisition, or when one does not know he has a claim
to citizenship.107 The possibility of error is higher when this complexity is combined with speed. Professor
Lee Terán describes the wrongful deportation of Wilfredo Garza, the son of a United States citizen who
raised a citizenship claim to DHS:
Mr. Garza filed an application for certificate of citizenship to DHS, and
he repeatedly told the officer that he had a claim to citizenship. DHS
failed to consider Mr. Garza’s claim and simply removed him. The risk
of removal of individuals with citizenship claims is high when
examination by DHS is limited to the identity of the individual subject to
reinstatement and whether he has previously been deported or removed.
The procedures implemented by DHS fail to require at a minimum a full
and objective investigation of the claim, cancellation of the reinstatement
order, and referral to the immigration judge. The unbridled use of INA
Section 241(a)(5) under procedures where there is no hearing before an
immigration judge and no meaningful opportunity to present a claim to
citizenship all but guarantees that individuals like Mr. Garza who have
unresolved claims to U.S. citizenship are removed.108
C.

The Government’s Interest
1.

Improving Efficiency

The policy goals of accelerating deportation for select populations are partially economic. In
describing the cost-savings associated with the expedited removal program, former INS General Counsel
David Martin noted, “The ER process allows INS to issue formal removal orders even more efficiently,
particularly where asylum is not at issue . . . [ER] takes a matter of hours rather than days, and in the
overwhelming majority of such cases, as before, there is no genuine issue about whether fraud has been
106 See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL ET. AL., MONCRIEFFE V. HOLDER: IMPLICATIONS FOR DRUG
CHARGES AND OTHER ISSUES INVOLVING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH 6-7 (May 2, 2013), available at
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Moncrieffe-PA-5-1-13-FINAL.pdf.
107 See generally Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 637 (2011); see also Koh, supra note 101 (describing the complexity of U.S. citizenship claims and the
large numbers of U.S. citizens have been subject to immigration enforcement).
108 Lee. J Terán, Mexican Children of U.S. Citizens: “Vignes Prin” and Other Tales of Challenges to Asserting Acquired
U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR 583, 662-63 (2012).
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attempted.”109 Accelerating removal through programs like administrative, expedited, and reinstatement
removal improves economic efficiency. Such removals avoid the costs associated with an administrative
hearing before the immigration judge, time from the DHS trial attorney, an interpreter, law clerk,
transcriber, and future appeals. Indeed, EOIR statistics are staggering as immigration judges handle
thousands of matters each year.110 The crisis faced by immigration courts persist and as stated in a frontpage story that ran in The Washington Post in February 2014:
[D]ay after day, case after case, in one of the 57 overwhelmed immigration
courts across the country. Here, on the second floor of a high rise in
Crystal City, tissue boxes are stacked near the courtroom entrance and
attorneys push rolling file cabinets, because a briefcase is no longer
sufficient to hold caseloads that have tripled in the past decade.111
Described by one immigration judge as “doing death penalty cases in traffic court” the job of an
immigration judge is stressful:
Tough was hearing 1,500 cases per year while federal judges decided 440.
It was sharing one law clerk with other immigration judges while each
federal judge had four clerks of his own. It was being scheduled to sit on
the bench for 36 hours a week and listen to asylum cases that detailed
people’s escapes from gangs, rapes, beheadings, human trafficking and
torture; and then having to objectively ask those people for the
documents, for the scars, for the proof; and then making a judgment
about the character of those people, first through a video feed and then
through an interpreter; and then judging the merits of their cases in the
shifting landscape of immigration law; and finally taking a deep breath,
synthesizing so much information, and rendering a lawful, smart, artful,
confident decision on the spot, because the schedule allowed little time
for reflection or written decisions before the next case began.112
The tension faced in immigration courts was heightened by a furlough of the federal government in 2013,
which set the court backlog back even further. As described in one related news account: “Immigration
Judge Dana Leigh Marks said she doesn't have two weeks open on her calendar in San Francisco's
immigration court for merit hearings until June 2017. And she can't just bump people with court dates this
year, because they've also been waiting for their day in court.”113 If people who are placed in removal
Martin, supra note 88.
EOIR Statistics for 2012 reveals that that the immigration courts completed 382,675 matters. OFFICE OF
PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY2012 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
B2 (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf. According to TRAC, as of January 2014, the
number of pending deportation cases was at an all-time high of 360,186. Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of
January 2014, TRACIMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php (last
visited Mar. 10, 2014).
111 Eli Saslow, In a Crowded Immigration Court, Seven Minutes to Decide a Family’s Future, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-a-crowded-immigration-court-seven-minutes-to-decide-afamilys-future/2014/02/02/518c3e3e-8798-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html.
112 Id.
113 Amy Taxin, Government Shutdown Hurt More Than 37,000 Immigration Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2014,
12:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/22/government-shutdown-immigration_n_4838375.html. In
2013, the average number of days a pending case had been open was 760 days; in January 2014, the average was 809
days. Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of January 2014, supra note 110; see also Daniel M. Kowalski, 555-Day
Backlog at Houston Immigration Court, LEXISNEXIS NEWSROOM, IMMIGRATION LAW (Dec. 24, 2013, 9:21AM),
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proceedings are waiting for up to two years to be scheduled for a trial or what is commonly called the
“individual calendar hearing,”114 then what kind of resources would be needed to provide such hearings
for individuals who are currently processed through a speed deportation program?
Proponents of speed deportation also may view it as an efficient deterrent for stemming unlawful
migration into the United States.115 Arguably, a Mexican national who is considering re-entry into the
United States following a removal order may be deterred from doing so based on his knowledge of the
reinstatement statute and the fact that he can be removed without consideration of his equities like a
United States citizen child. But speed removal programs are not effective as deterrents if people have
compelling reasons to be in the United States. For example, reunification with a family or prospect of
steady employment are factors that often propel migration in spite of the related risks. Likewise, it is hard
to confirm if individuals potentially at risk for speed deportation have knowledge about these programs
and the consequences that follow. Nevertheless, the literature on unauthorized migration suggests that
people come to the United States for opportunity and in spite of the risks of potential deportation.116
Beyond the scope of this Article but critical to understanding the root causes for migration is the wave of
families and unaccompanied minors entering the United States from Central America. Social scientists,
legal experts and the United Nations have identified violence, not poverty, as a key driver for this migration
wave.117
2.

Enforcement Mission

Another important policy question is the degree to which speed removal programs support the
mission of DHS. According to its website, ICE’s primary mission is to “promote homeland security and
public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs,
trade and immigration.”118 Higher deportation numbers also benefit the image the government seeks to
portray to the policymakers who support amplified immigration enforcement. As described in the press
release by DHS in connection with its 2013 removals:
These figures highlight ICE's ongoing commitment to primary
immigration enforcement missions: the apprehension of criminal aliens
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/outsidenews/archive/2013/12/24/555-day-backlog-athouston-immigration-court.aspx; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN
THE ADJUDICATION OF IMMIGRATION CASES (2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
114 INTRODUCTION TO THE MASTER CALENDAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/Purpose_and_History_of_MC.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
115 See, e.g., ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33109, IMMIGRATION
POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 15 (2005), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/54512.pdf (“In addition, there is evidence that the most recent expansion
of expedited removal along the southwest border has decreased the apprehensions of OTMs along the border,72 which
may imply that the expansion of expedited removal has been a deterrent to those trying to enter the country illegally”).
116 See, e.g., Chiamaka Nwosu et. al., Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States,
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statisticsimmigrants-and-immigration-united-states.
117 See, e.g., Sonia Nazario, The Children of the Drug Wars, A Refugee Crisis, Not an Immigration Crisis , N. Y. TIMES
(July 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/opinion/sunday/a-refugee-crisis-not-an-immigrationcrisis.html?_r=0.
118 Overview, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
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and other immigration violators in the interior of the United States; and
the detention and removal of individuals apprehended by ICE and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) while attempting to unlawfully
enter the United States.119
ICE linked the removal numbers to the agency’s commitment to enforcement and the surge in removals
involving an identified “priority,”120 but advocates for immigration reform were critical of the continued
deportation apparatus and fact that some people deported might in the future qualify for a legalization
program.121 Likewise, immigration advocates have been wary about how DHS defines a “priority”,
especially as “recent illegal entrants” and “aliens who are fugitives or otherwise obstruct immigration
controls” are deemed to be “priorities” for enforcement even though many people who fall into these
categories lack a criminal background or history that ordinary people would calculate as serious.122
Criticism over DHS’s removal record has been directed not only at DHS, the agency responsible for
executing removal orders, but also at the Obama administration. At the annual awards dinner of the
National Council of La Raza, its president, Janet Murgia, labeled President Barack Obama as the “deporterin-chief.”123 At the same dinner, Democratic Senator Robert Menendez remarked, “While we continue
waiting for the House of Representatives to wake up and move on immigration reform legislation, I urge
the President to take action today and halt needless deportations that are splitting apart our families and
communities.”124 Even before ICE released its removal numbers for 2013, policy think tanks and
journalists wrote fierce headlines highlighting that President Obama has deported more noncitizens each
year than were deported during the entirety of the George W. Bush administration.125 While one may
conclude that DHS has utilized speed deportations in order to keep their removal statistics high for
political reasons, the merits of this choice may not be as simple and are worthy of debate.
In March 2014, President Obama indicated that DHS would review its deportation numbers and
he emphasized his “deep concern about the pain too many families feel from the separation that comes
from our broken immigration system.”126 Thereafter, members of the media, members of Congress, and
advocates published ideas and recommendations for modifying the current deportation policy. Indeed,
the “government interest” behind speed deportation is further complicated by efficient removal of priority
subjects on the one hand and protecting family members and others with equities from removal on the
Id.
See Memorandum from Morton, supra note 14; see also WADHIA, supra note 18.
121 See, e.g., Walter Ewing, New ICE Deportation Statistics Are No Cause for Celebration, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Dec.
20, 2013), http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/12/20/new-ice-deportation-statistics-are-no-cause-for-celebration/.
122 See Memorandum from Morton, supra note 14; see also Maria Ines Zamudio, Felony Deportation Decline as ICE
Officers Resist Former Chief’s 2010 Directive, THE CHICAGO REPORTER (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.chicagoreporter.com/felony-deportations-decline-ice-officers-resist-former-chiefs-2010-directive.
123 Justin Sink, Obama Rebukes Deportation Criticism, THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2014, 12:30 pm),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/200106-obama-rebukes-deportation-criticism.
124 Alexander Bolton, Dems to Obama: Slow the Deportations, THE HILL (June 6, 2014, 6:00 am),
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/200066-dems-to-obama-slow-the-deportations.
125 See, e.g., Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and Mark Hugo Lopez, High rate of deportations continue under Obama despite
Latino disapproval, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FACT TANK (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2013/09/19/high-rate-of-deportations-continue-under-obama-despite-latino-disapproval/.
126 Press Briefing, Press Secretary Jay Carney & Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (March 14, 2014)
(available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/03/14/press-briefing); see also, Michael
D. Shear, Obama Orders Review of Deportations, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/us/obama-orders-review-of-deportations.html; Michael D. Shear & Julia
Preston, Deportation Policy Shift is Signaled by Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/us/politics/deportation-policy-shift-is-signaled-byobama.html?hpw&rref=politics&_r=0.
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other hand, and makes it that much more difficult to clarify. Nevertheless, creating an enforcement policy
that is also humane is part of the mission of DHS. In discussing how expedited removal in particular is
tied to a broader enforcement strategy, Professor David Martin argues:
It makes sense to concentrate immigration enforcement at the border. As
a general matter, catching violators during the first attempt at entry
prevents inadmissible aliens from establishing homes, employment, and
other ties to this country. This enforcement strategy also makes it easier
for the individual involved to resume their lives in their countries of
origin.127
Though Professor Martin’s view was provided in the context of expedited removals only, it raises a policy
question for this Article about whether first-time violators with an expedited removal order are
distinguishable from other subjects of speed deportation who have the kinds of equities and hardships
showcased by immigration advocates. Certainly, and as identified earlier, there remains the possibility for
one person to interact with more than one type of speed deportation program by, for example, entering
the United States without documents and then getting ejected through expedited removal and by reentering the United States years later only to face a reinstatement order regardless of equities.
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCRETION AND SPEED DEPORTATION

DHS has discretion in deciding whether to subject an individual to speed deportation.128
Individuals who have equities (such as a spouse who is a United States citizen) a serious medical disability,
or eligibility for formal relief should be given a full court proceeding and the opportunity to apply for relief
from removal that they may otherwise be prohibited from seeking. The premise that DHS can exercise
discretion by placing such individuals in removal proceedings before an immigration judge (as opposed to
a speedy one) is established in the statute, case law, general principles of prosecutorial discretion, agency
memoranda, and secondary treatises.129 “Prosecutorial discretion” refers to a decision by the immigration
agency about whether, and to what extent, the DHS should enforce immigration laws against a person or
group.
Broad authority for prosecutorial discretion can be found in Section 103 of the INA, which affirms
that DHS “[is] charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act and all other laws relating to
the immigration and naturalization of aliens.”130 The Supreme Court has also recognized the legality of
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context. In the case Arizona v. United States, the Court wrote,
“Removal is a civil matter, and one of its principal features is the broad discretion exercised by immigration
officials, who must decide whether to pursue removal at all.”131 Such discretion is also supported by the
language of the statute and case law specific to reinstatement, expedited removal, and administrative
removal. In the reinstatement context, the Ninth Circuit found that “Even though an alien is not entitled
to a hearing before an immigration judge on the issue of reinstatement of a prior removal order, nothing
in [the statute] or its implementing regulations deprives the agency of discretion to afford an alien a new
plenary removal hearing.”132 Citing to the wide prosecutorial discretion held by DHS, the court continued:
Martin, supra note 90, at 687.
See generally Memorandum from Morton, supra note 14.
129 See, e.g., § INA 238(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1238(b) (1) (2014); Memorandum from Morton, supra note 14;
Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 3 (Oct. 24,
2005) available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=1016%7C6715%7C8412%7C18465%7C17718.
130 INA § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C § 1103(a)(1) (2014).
131 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
132 Villa-Anguiano v. Attorney General, 727 F.3d 873, 878 (2013).
127
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Particularly when there is any question about whether the requirements
of 241.5 [sic] have been satisfied and even they have been, an ICE officer may
decide to forgo reinstatement of a prior order of removal in favor of
initiating new removal proceedings with accompanying procedural rights
to counsel and a hearing in immigration court.133
In the administrative removal context, the statute explicitly gives DHS a choice to place a person
in speed deportation or 240 removal proceedings. Specially, Section 238(b)(1) of the INA states that the
[Secretary of Homeland Security] “[M]ay, in the case of an alien described in paragraph (2) [relating to nonLPRS] determine the deportability of such alien under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and issue an order of
removal pursuant to the procedures set forth in this subsection or section 240.”134 The language of the
statute leaves open the possibility that DHS has prosecutorial discretion to place a person legally subject
to 238(b) before a trier of fact in a 240 removal proceeding.
Likewise, in the expedited removal context, the BIA held that INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) does not limit
the prosecutorial discretion of DHS to place “arriving aliens” in removal proceedings under section 240
of the Act.135 Notably, the Board held:
First, we observe that the issue arises in the context of a purported
restraint on the DHS’s exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. In that
context, we find that Congress’ use of the term “shall” in section
235(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act does not carry its ordinary meaning, namely,
that an act is mandatory. It is common for the term “shall” to mean
“may” when it relates to decisions made by the Executive Branch of the
Government on whether to charge an individual and on what charge or
charges to bring.136
The BIA has also found that the statute supports the choice of DHS instead to place individuals who may
be subject to expedited removal in a regular removal proceeding. While one part of the statute states that
an officer faced with arriving noncitizens who are inadmissible for reasons of fraud or a lack of proper
documentation “shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or
review,”137 the statutory language also considers these same individuals for regular removal proceedings.
As articulated by the BIA:
[W]e find that the statutory scheme itself supports our reading that the
DHS has discretion to put aliens in section 240 removal proceedings even
though they may also be subject to expedited removal under section
235(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act. Section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Act provides that
“in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
Id. (emphasis added).
See INA § 238(b)(1), 8 U.S.C § 1228(b)(1) (2014) (internal citations omitted).
135 Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520 (BIA 2011). Notably, the Board itself acknowledged that
placing individuals in removal proceedings would be preferable. “The respondents are not prejudiced by their placement
in section 240 removal proceedings and, in fact, have more rights available to them in proceedings under section 240
than in expedited removal proceedings, where aliens may only raise persecution-related relief.” Id.
136 Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520.
137 See INA 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1235(b)(1)(A)(i) (2014).
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clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained for a proceeding under section 240.138
Agency guidance documents have also affirmed the role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration
law. The act of abstaining from enforcing the immigration law against a person through a favorable
exercise of prosecutorial discretion can take place at many different stages of the enforcement process, not
just the charging stage. Not only may the immigration agency exercise prosecutorial discretion at different
stages of enforcement, but it may also use a variety of different tools to carry out this discretion. There
are more than twenty different kinds of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, including, but not
limited to: a decision to cancel a charging document called the Notice to Appear, a decision to release a
person from detention even if that person legally qualifies for custody, and a decision to not execute a
removal order and instead issue a stay of deportation and supervision order for someone who has already
been ordered removed.139 The seminal guidance document from ICE on prosecutorial discretion identifies
“deciding to issue, reissue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Appear (NTA)” as among several forms of
prosecutorial discretion.140 Importantly, the filing of the NTA is a significant point in the immigration
enforcement process as it commences a “removal proceeding” pursuant to § 240 of the Act.141 In general,
while a decision by DHS to refrain from filing an NTA is often viewed as a favorable exercise of
prosecutorial discretion (e.g., in the case of a noncitizen who is ineligible for any relief from removal), the
filing of an NTA is a positive act for individuals otherwise subject to administrative, expedited, or
reinstatement removal because it provides them with the opportunity to apply for relief in a full and fair
hearing before a neutral trier-of-fact.142 The agency must consider humanitarian factors and the possibility
for other relief when deciding to place a person who legally qualifies for speed deportation in removal
proceedings instead.143
One policy challenge for advocates seeking to rely on guidance documents to advance
prosecutorial discretion in these situations is the fact that the enforcement arm of DHS does not support
this policy. Instead, ICE supports a policy that discourages NTA issuance in favor of speed deportation
regarding prosecutorial discretion. For example, a 2005 DHS memo instructs “We should attempt to
discourage issuance of NTAs where there are other options available, such as administrative removal,
crewman removal, expedited removal, or reinstatement.”144 Arguably, the desire by DHS to discourage
NTAs is economically motivated. This is especially true when the noncitizen lacks family ties, equities,
eligibility for immigration relief outside of a removal withholding or CAT exemption, or other
Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I & N Dec. 520.
See Memorandum from Morton, supra note 14; see also CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, PENN. ST. UNIV.
DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW, TO FILE OR NOTE TO FILE A NOTICE TO APPEAR: IMPROVING THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (2013), available at
https://law.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/NTAReportFinal.pdf.
140 Memorandum from Morton, supra note 14.
141 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a).
142 See, e.g., CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 7 n.9.
143 Memorandum from Morton, supra note 14 (“The following positive factors should prompt particular care
and consideration:
• veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces;
• long-time lawful permanent residents;
• minors and elderly individuals;
• individuals present in the United States since childhood;
• pregnant or nursing women;
• victims of domestic violence; trafficking, or other serious crimes;
• individuals who suffer from a serious mental or physical disability; and
• individuals with serious health conditions”).
144 Memorandum from Howard, supra note 129.
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humanitarian factors that should be considered. However, it may also be true that without an NTA or
removal hearing, the government is unable to identify individuals who might fall into one of these more
sympathetic categories. For example, if a person is subject to an administrative removal order because of
an alleged aggravated felony conviction, DHS may have no reason to elicit information from the noncitizen
about his equities or individual circumstances.145 Moreover, even when a person subject to reinstatement
or administrative removal expresses a reasonable fear that is eventually documented by an asylum officer,
the only forms of relief considered by the immigration judge at a withholding-only hearing are traditional
withholding of removal and protections under CAT, neither of which necessitate an exploration into the
discretionary factors specific to an individual or potential other relief such as adjustment of status or
cancellation of removal.
Each time DHS places a person in administrative, expedited or reinstatement of removal without
consideration of (1) specific individual factors like family in the United States or (2) ambiguities
surrounding the underlying conduct giving rise to removal and other humanitarian circumstances, DHS is
failing to exercise prosecutorial discretion. For example, in regards to Eduardo, DHS could use its
discretion under the statute or general principles of prosecutorial discretion to place Eduardo in regular
removal proceedings by filing a Notice to Appear in lieu of issuing him an administrative removal order.
The benefit for Eduardo is the opportunity to apply for relief from removal such as adjustment of status
based on marriage to a United States citizen and a waiver of inadmissibility based on his criminal
conviction. Eduardo or his counsel would also have the opportunity to challenge removability before the
immigration judge, but DHS placing Eduardo into removal proceedings would not automatically lead to
relief for Eduardo. It would provide him with a day in court and the opportunity to seek relief and related
waivers from an immigration judge, which are not available to individuals subject to a final administrative
removal order.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article began with an examination of deportations resulting from the expedited removal,
administrative removal, and reinstatement of removal orders and considered whether these programs are
good policy following the framework outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge. This Article then examined the degree
to which the immigration agency has discretion to place individuals subject to a speed removal program
into regular removal proceedings.
DHS should provide a fair day in court for those who qualify for relief from removal or whom
the administration has determined warrant protection from removal based on individual equities.146 DHS
could issue a guideline stating that any person facing a legally sufficient charge or determination that he is
removable or inadmissible through expedited, administrative, or reinstatement of removal should be
automatically screened under the following factors to determine if a regular full court proceeding is
appropriate:

145 One scholar argues that “court-observers, advocates, and federal judges frequently note the fervent manner
in which some ICE attorneys prosecute removal cases by pursuing inaccurate or inflated grounds for removal, refusing
to negotiate, stipulate, or even communicate with noncitizens or their representatives before hearings; failing to turn
over evidence bearing on removability; and opposing discretionary relief no matter how clear the merits or how strong
the equities.” Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeking Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014).
146 Possibly, a full review and modification of immigration prosecutorial discretion would reduce the number of
noncitizens who are targeted for enforcement in the first place but a discussion of broader administrative solutions like
deferred action are beyond the scope of this Article.
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•
eligibility for relief from removal, including, but not limited to,
challenges to removability, adjustment of status or viable asylum claims;
•
veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces;
•
long-time lawful permanent residents;
•
minors147 and the elderly;
•
individuals who have lived in the United States since childhood;
•
pregnant or nursing women;
•
victims of domestic violence; trafficking, or other serious
crimes;
•
parents of children who are US citizens or lawful permanent
residents;
•
individuals who suffer from a serious mental or physical
disability; and
•
individuals with serious health conditions.148
As part of this new process, DHS could create a screening form for officers to use in conjunction with its
decision about whether or not to place a person in a speed deportation. As a legal mater, this screening
would not undermine the existing statutory framework for speed deportation. With any proposal,
screening individuals may raise costs, but they are necessary to ensure the agency carries out its own policy
in a prudent manner. At a minimum, such measures can save the agency costs associated with litigation,
damaging news stories, and demands from advocates and attorneys for better solutions.
While the Article supports the authority and use of discretion by DHS to place noncitizens subject
to a speed removal into removal proceedings before an immigration judge, it is necessary to also consider
the degree to which this position can be reconciled with the policy challenges faced by immigration courts.
It is a difficult task to address the tension between this Article’s recommendation and the desire to boost
the number of cases by employing prosecutorial discretion in favor of NTAs for individuals who might
ordinarily qualify for a speed deportation program in the face of an overstretched immigration court
system. However, it may very well be worth the expense to protect the noncitizen from removal or at the
very least provide her with the dignity and protection of a day in court. Moreover, there are costs associated
with the family members and responsibilities a deportee leaves behind, for example, the primary care for
a minor child who is a United States citizen or full time employment for a burgeoning American
company.149
This category should include unaccompanied minors based on a plain reading of the term and the recent
policy announcements by the Administration to improve safeguards for this population. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department and CNCS Announces New Partnership to Enhance Immigration Courts and
Provide Critical Assistance to Unaccompanied Minors, (June 6, 2014), (available online at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/June/14-ag-609.html).
148 Several of these factors are classified as warranting particular consideration for a favorable act of
prosecutorial discretion in Memorandum from Morton, supra note 14.
149 As synthesized in one article: “The deportations [of parents] have a ripple effect, advocates say. A 2010 Urban
Institute study looked at the consequences of parent arrest, detention and deportation on nearly 200 children from 85
families in six locations. Most families lost a working parent, and housing instability and food insecurity were prevalent.
About two-thirds of the children experienced changes in their eating and sleeping habits in the months afterward. More
than half said they cried a lot and were more fearful. A third showed more anger or aggression.” Michael Alison Chandler,
Deportations of Parents Can Cast the Lives of U.S.-Citizen Kids into Turmoil, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 29, 2013),
147

http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/deportations-of-parents-can-cast-the-lives-of-uscitizen-kids-into-turmoil/2013/12/29/abdf23aa-6b4c-11e3-b405-7e360f7e9fd2_story.html; see also Eli
Saslow,
A
‘Band-Aid’
for
800
Children,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/07/05/a-band-aid-for-800-children/.
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If speed deportation programs are here to stay, DHS must operate these programs with an
understanding of how discretion fits into this process and protect those who are important additions to
the United States.

